# Author: Flavio do Carmo Junior aka waKKu
# URL: Author’s Webpage
# Date: November 25, 2011
# Category: Assembly, Exploiting, Programming, Security
Hi folks… Long time no see, huh?
Yeah, Aussie life has kept me quite busy, however, if you live in Sydney you know that the weather has not been friendly lately…
Enough of BS, let’s see what matters.
I was following a thread in one of those maillists, and someone said that he was having difficult to see how Non-eXecutable Stack works properly, so I will try to illustrate it here.
First of all, we need to separate things. There are two things that are usually mistaken by the same.
Executable Space Protection: The PTE (Page Table Entry) is a set of control bits at the begining of each page (1 page = 4096 bytes), responsible to control things such as readable, writeable, user or supervisor, present or not, physical address, etc. At this moment, there was no eXecutable bit, therefore a readable page was also considered eXecutable. Those guys from PaX are always trying to make the world more secure and then they came with a solution to protect some memory areas from execution. However, the only alternative was a control by memory segment, what was cool but not perfect. This technique is based on highest address execution, where you can set the highest address which can be executable, but the start point is always the same. Therefore, if your application needs execution at 0xbeefdead address, it will need to mark everything from the 0x08048000 up to 0xbeefdead.
Hardware Bit: With the introduction of 64bits CPUs the word size doubled, allowing enough space to add a new bit, eXecutable bit, within the PTE. The 63rd bit (Most Significant Bit) was chosen to control eXectuable/Not eXecutable page. At this time, guys from PaX and other implementations (Red Hat Exec-Shield, for instance), improved their control to a page level in 64bits CPUs. The RH exec-shield patch was merged into the kernel 2.6.8 (IIRC) mainstream and now Linux has native Executable Space Protection for x86_64. Nevertheless,
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